Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1987

Article 1

3-1987

Promoting Truth in the Courtroom
Edwin Meese, III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edwin Meese, III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 Vanderbilt Law Review 271 (1987)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol40/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 40

MARCH 1987

NUMBER 2

Promoting Truth in the
Courtroom*
The Honorable Edwin Meese III**
It is a distinct privilege to be with you and to join my predecessors as Attorney General-Elliot Richardson, Judge Griffin Bell,

and William French Smith-in becoming a Cecil Sims Lecturer.
One of the best features of university life is the freedom it
affords to pursue the search for knowledge. In virtually all disciplines an understanding of certain truths, of the way various historical or scientific facts fit together, is an important starting point
for further learning and deliberation. The search for truth is also a
tremendously important undertaking beyond the campus walls,
especially in the realm of criminal justice. That endeavor, the effort to arrive at an accurate assessment of the truth or falsity of
charges of criminal misconduct, is the subject of my remarks
today.
To most of us the point of a criminal trial is to determine
whether the defendant did what he is accused of and to impose a
just sentence if he is convicted on the basis of that determination.
Getting the correct answer in this context is of the utmost importance. Mistakes in one direction will falsely brand innocent people
as criminals and punish them unjustly. Mistakes in the other
direction, freeing guilty defendants, also have dire consequences.
Dangerous individuals may be set loose upon society, public
respect for the legal system may be diminished, and, most importantly, justice will not be done. The objectives of protecting the
public from the offender and deterring others from committing
* Copyright 0 by Edwin Meese III. This speech was delivered as the Cecil Sims Lecture
at Vanderbilt University School of Law on October 6, 1986.
** Attorney General of the United States.
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crimes cannot be achieved if guilt is not accurately established.
These objectives are not casual concerns, but the basic reasons
that a criminal justice system exists. If the truth cannot be discovered and acted on, the criminal justice system fails in its basic mission. Indeed, the state itself fails in its most fundamental
responsibility.
Accordingly, I'm reminded of the words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Sr., the Justice's father, who said: "Truth is tough. It will
not break, like a bubble, at a touch; nay, you may kick it about all
day, like a football, and it will be round and full at evening."'
If you'll pardon the expression, there are too many ways truth
is kept out of play today in the arenas of our courts. We need to
look seriously at the various ways in which truthfinding has been
frustrated.
My purpose today is to consider whether the vital objective of
truth has been subordinated to other interests and whether the
hurdles placed between the facts on the one hand and the judge or
jury on the other can be justified. There are, of course, many such
hurdles. I won't talk about all of them. But let me focus my attention on several of the most significant.
First, this year marked two significant legal anniversaries: the
twenty-fifth anniversary of Mapp v. Ohio,2 which applied the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states in search and
seizure cases, and the twentieth anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona,3 the case establishing the rules that now govern custodial
interrogations. Both cases, and their progeny, have had a profound
impact on the search for truth. Next, I will address the rules limiting adverse inferences from silence. They also involve significant
restrictions on getting reliable evidence before a factfinder. Finally,
there is a topic of special relevance for future members of the bar.
I am referring to the abuse of the system by some practitioners.
The problems I will be addressing are not inherent in our legal
traditions or the nature of an adversary system. Most of them are
quite accurately "problem children" of the law, born of the radical
innovations of the 1960s. Too many lawyers and judges were then
willing to compromise the search for truth in favor of extrinsic policy objectives, as they grew fascinated with complex, formalistic
courtroom rules and procedures. In the process, we subordinated
1. 0. W.

HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE 109

2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

(1897).
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the objective of reaching a true and just result in any particular
case. When viewed against the broad sweep of American legal history and our even older common-law traditions, it is clearly wrong
to see these truth-defeating changes as constituting a deeply
rooted part of our legal heritage. Correcting these changes involves
a restoration of enduring legal principles, not their abolition.
The question is this: Have these truth-defeating doctrines
made any practical difference? The answer is clearly yes.
Consider one example: In 1983 a twenty-three year old woman
by the name of Denise Hubbard Sanders was murdered after testifying in a drug trafficking case against members of the "Bandidos"
motorcycle gang. Police arrested a Bandido named Ronnie Gaspard for the crime. He was informed of his Miranda rights and
waived them. He then made a full confession of murdering Denise
Sanders. Nevertheless, Gaspard walked away a free man. The reason? A court ruled that his confession was inadmissible on the
ground that he had been routinely assigned counsel on his entry
into jail but had not subsequently initiated conversations with the
4
police.
According to newspaper accounts, a parent of the woman
whom Gaspard had shot in the head said that what hurt most was
watching the confessed killer walk out of the Fort Worth courtroom with a "big smirky grin" on his face.'
Sadly, as your casebooks remind you, this example is not an
isolated affront to justice. In 1966 Justice Byron White warned in
his Miranda dissent that "[iln some unknown number of cases the
Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the
... environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but
a loss, in human dignity."' That prophecy has proved tragically
correct.
In the Gaspard case, like many others, there was no question
that the confession was voluntary. There was no question about its
reliability. There was only a question of tripping on judicially invented rules.
Those who favor the status quo will argue predictably that
such judge-made rules are necessary to protect basic individual
4. See Confession of Ronnie Dale Gaspard, Tarrant County, Texas (Jan. 23, 1984) (on

file with author).
5.

Sennott, Murder Suspect Goes Free on Technicality, Fort Worth Star-Telegram,

Sept. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
6.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
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rights, that without them our Bill of Rights would be undercut.
But properly understood, the Constitution itself rebuts these

claims.
The provisions of the Bill of Rights have a dual purpose. They
provide firm checks against abuses of governmental power, but
they also make secure rights and practices-such as the jury trial,
the confrontation right, and the right to the assistance of counsel-that promote accurate factfinding. These provisions ensure
that a criminal proceeding will be neither arbitrary nor unfair, but
a search for truth. I support strong enforcement of the Bill of
Rights, but want to see that it is enforced without unduly
obstructing the truth.
The rules of the two anniversary cases, Mapp and Miranda,
impede the search for truth. Mapp excludes evidence that has
been seized illegally-a consideration that has nothing to do with
the evidence's probative value or reliability. Similarly, the
Miranda rules exclude statements obtained from the defendant
when certain procedural rules have been violated, no matter how
reliable and material such statements may be. The rules arising
from these cases not only reflect bad policy; they are in no sense
required by the Constitution.
Let me begin with the exclusionary rule. In a number of decisions-such as United States v. Calandra and United States v.
Leon-the Supreme Court has made clear that the exclusionary
rule is not required by the fourth amendment or any other provision of the Constitution. It survives today only as a judicially created prophylactic rule designed to deter police misconduct.7
Benjamin Cardozo stated the basic problem clearly. Why is it,
he asked, that the criminal should go free because the constable
blunders?8 Of all possible penalties for government misconduct,
throwing away reliable evidence carries the highest cost to the
search for truth. It is also a wholly inapt means of protecting individual rights. The windfall chance at acquittal the exclusionary
rule offers to the guilty defendant may be completely disproportionate to any wrong done to him. Conversely, it provides no remedy for the innocent suspect who would be acquitted anyway.
When the exclusionary rule frees a criminal to claim other victims,
7. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347-48 (1974); see United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443, 446-47 (1976); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83, 486 (1976).

8.

People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied sub nom. Defore

v. New York, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
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it is the innocent public-not the responsible officer-that is effectively punished.' Our continued tolerance of these costs rests on
the slender reed that the rule may deter police misconduct.
There is heated debate over whether the rule actually does
deter police misconduct. 10 But the real point is that there are ways
to secure compliance with the fourth amendment that do not turn
criminals loose on society.
I am absolutely convinced that officers and investigators
should be trained to understand and follow the rules governing
searches and seizures. When those rules are violated, appropriate
sanctions should be imposed. But we should discipline and deter
misconduct outside the forum of the criminal prosecution itself.
Make the offending constable, not the public, pay the price.11
The Miranda custodial interrogation rules raise similar issues.
The Supreme Court has made it clear, in such cases as Michigan v.
Tucker, New York v. Quarles, and Oregon v. Elstad, that the
Miranda rules are not constitutional requirements. They are only
suggested safeguards meant to reduce the likelihood of fifth
amendment violations.1 2 The fifth amendment itself only provides
that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself.
It is not violated unless incriminating statements are extracted
from a defendant through actual coercion, whether outside the
courtroom or inside the courtroom.
The Miranda Court sought to justify its creation of a nonconstitutional, prophylactic right to have counsel present at police
interrogations as a means of guarding against coercion and of
preventing later misrepresentations of a suspect's statements to
the police.13 But these very interests were well served before
Miranda by a line of decisions protecting criminal suspects against
coercive interrogations and the use of unreliable statements.
Moreover, such decisions did not come at the great price in lost
9. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-91 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415-20 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,

dissenting).
10. See S.

SCHLESINGER,

EXCLUSIONARY

INJUsTICa. THE PROBLEM

OF ILLEGALLY

OBTAINED EVIDENCE 50-60 (1977); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CH1. L. REV. 665, 754-56 (1970).

11. See generally Schroeder, DeterringFourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives
to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1385-1412 (1981); Wilkey, The Exclusionary
Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215, 227-32 (1978).
12. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307-11 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654-58 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-46 (1974); see also Moran v.
Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143 (1986); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 490 (1966).
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70.
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prosecutions and convictions imposed by Miranda.4
Miranda's right to counsel does not guard against interrogation abuses so much as it forecloses any interrogation at all. As
Justice Jackson observed, "Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statements to [the]
police under any circumstances."' 5 Miranda thus transforms the
constitutional right not to be subjected to compelled self-incrimination into a right not to be subjected to any questioning.1 6
There are clearly other ways to safeguard the genuine rights at
issue here. Possible safeguards might include, for example, setting
reasonable time limits on interrogations and requiring that interrogations be tape or video recorded whenever practical. 7 These other
means would enable courts to satisfy themselves that statements
were freely made and might better protect the rights of suspects,
with far less cost to the truthfinding interest of the law, than the
existing, waivable right to counsel. Since the Miranda procedures
are not themselves constitutional rights, there is no reason that
such alternative rules could not be fashioned and implemented.
A cousin from the Miranda family tree, Massiah v. United
States,5 provides another example of a law that certainly deserves
questioning. Massiah, you may recall, is a right to counsel case
dating from 1964. Massiah, the defendant, was indicted for cocaine
smuggling and released on bail. He then made incriminating statements to an informant whose car had been wired for sound. These
statements were used at trial, and he was convicted. Here there
was no issue of coercion, no issue of reliability. Yet the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the ground that eliciting statements from a defendant after indictment without counsel present
9
violates the sixth amendment.'
The sixth amendment, however, isn't this elastic. It safeguards
only the accused's right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
14. See id. at 506-09 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Controlling Crime Through Effective
Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01, 1120 (1967); Seeburger &
Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1967).
15. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
16. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 473-74; see also id. at 516-17 & n.12 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
17. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4 & commentary at 341-42 (1975) (recording); 114 CONG. REC. 14,184-86 (1968)
(relating to six-hour time rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1982)).
18. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
19. Id. at 206-07.
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defense."2 0 This provision embodies the historical right to counsel's
assistance in preparing and presenting a defense at trial.As a matter of policy, a right to counsel is also properly recognized in other
courtroom proceedings involving a need for legal advocacy and
expertise to ensure fair treatment of the defendant.2 '
The Massiah rule, however, is unrelated to any conventional
function of counsel. The techniques employed by the police in
Massiah did not interfere with the preparation of a defense or
eavesdrop on any privileged communication with counsel. Undercover measures of this sort have been approved repeatedly for
preindictment investigations. 22 It is hard to understand why a different standard should apply after formal accusation.
The Massiah doctrine has been applied in later cases with
shocking consequences. In United States v. Henry a bank robbery
conviction was overturned simply because an informant testified
that the defendant had confessed during the course of some prison
conversations with him. 23 In the recent case of Maine v. Moulton,
the Court described Massiah as meaning that counsel must be present to serve as a "medium" between the accused and the state.24
But as one Justice aptly has pointed out, there is no support in the
Constitution itself for the notion that counsel "is a sort of guru
who must be present whenever an accused has an inclination to
reveal incriminating information" to a government agent,25 or for
that matter, any other person. The sixth amendment, of course,
does not say that a defendant has any right for counsel to serve as
an impenetrable wall between government and the accused after
formal charges, that the state's attempts to investigate the truth
are foreclosed. It provides only for counsel's assistance in preparing and presenting a defense at trial.
These cases, and others like them, reflect a dangerous turn of
thinking in the criminal law. Instead of addressing authentic con20.

U.S. CONsT. amend VI.

21. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-13 (1973). The extension of ostensibly
constitutional civil rights beyond the context of adversarial judicial proceedings was an
innovation of the 1960s. See id. at 310-11; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); United
States v. Wilson, 162 U.S. 613, 623-24 (1896); Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B.&C. 37, 107 Eng. Rep. 15
(1822); Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47 (1964).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
23. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977) (reversing conviction of murderer of ten year old girl under Massiah doctrine).
24. Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 487 (1985).
25. Henry, 447 U.S. at 295-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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stitutional rights, these decisions attempt to remake the law into
something resembling a sporting event. Unfortunately, what seems
to matter isn't whether someone is genuinely guilty, or even if he
or she is actually the victim of a constitutional violation. The law
represented in these cases appears instead to be most concerned
with giving criminal defendants a chance to "beat the odds" and
go free for reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence. The most effective investigatory techniques are increasingly met with new obstacles to their use.
The courts do have a vital role to perform. Violations of the
fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments need to be identified and dealt
with appropriately. But it does not follow that concealing important evidence from the factfinder is the proper remedy for such
violations. Instead, to the extent that wise policy can be rendered
in rules, it is for our legislators and administrators to craft regulations and policies that will both prevent violations of suspects'
rights and respect the important public interest in effective law
enforcement.
As I mentioned earlier, the exclusionary rule and misapplications of the right to counsel are not the only obstacles on the road
to truth. There are also the rules barring rational inferences from a
defendant's failure to respond to pretrial questioning or to take the
stand at trial.
The current rules are contrary to common sense. A credible
exculpatory story maintained from arrest through trial is, naturally, helpful to the credibility of a defense. On the other hand, if a
defendant refuses to explain away an accusation early on, but suddenly offers a new story at trial, his delay in providing an account
may naturally raise doubts concerning his credibility in the mind
of a reasonable trier of fact.
However, despite the fact that the Constitution does not mandate them, judicially invented rules now generally require that pretrial silence be concealed from the jury. The question is: Why?
Merely permitting rational inferences from a defendant's failure to
respond to accusations or to adverse evidence does not "compel"
him to be a witness against himself in the sense of the fifth amendment. In fact, at the time of the Bill of Rights' adoption, any
refusal by a defendant to answer questions in pretrial interrogations conducted by justices of the peace could be disclosed at trial
and could provide the basis for adverse inferences by the jury.2 6
26. See L. MAYERS,

SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT?

16, 175, 180, 188 (1959);
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The Supreme Court also has affirmed in recent decisions that there
is no general constitutional bar to admitting pretrial silence to
27
impeach a defendant's trial testimony.
Yet in Doyle v. Ohio the Supreme Court held that a defendant's silence following the receipt of Miranda warnings cannot be
disclosed to the factfinder. 28 The Court reasoned that suspects
might misunderstand the warnings-"you have the right to remain
silent," and so on-as an assurance by the government that silence
will not work against them in any way. Since suspects normally get
Miranda warnings at or near the time of arrest, the Doyle rule, in
practical effect, generally requires the concealment of pretrial
silence from the jury.
Happily, there seems to be a simple means of correcting the
problem. Miranda warnings could be modified or supplemented so
that they could not be misunderstood in the way that the Doyle
Court feared. For example, a suspect could be advised explicitly
that his failure to make a statement or answer questions may be
disclosed in court and may reduce the likelihood that any story or
explanation he offers later will be believed. With "fair notice"
along these lines, there would be no reason to deny the jury the
whole truth about the defendant's pretrial behavior.
A defendant's failure to take the stand at trial can be just as
telling as his silence before trial. Until 1965 the Supreme Court
held constitutional the adverse comment by a judge or prosecutor
on a defendant's failure to testify in a state trial-a practice widely
endorsed on policy grounds by leading writers and model rules of
evidence. 29
Unfortunately, in Griffin v. California,reversing a conviction
for a brutal murder, the Court departed from precedent and
adopted a contrary rule.30 Once again, common sense and the ability of the factfinder to draw reasonable inferences suffered a
defeat. I believe the Supreme Court stated the better rule in its
1947 decision Adamson v. California,wherein it said: "[W]e see no
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1949).
27. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447
U.S. 231 (1980).
28. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
29. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908); see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 622 & nn.6-8 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 929,
938-40 (1965).
30. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615 (holding prosecutor's comment to jury on defendant's failure to testify unconstitutional).
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reason why comment should not be made upon [the defendant's]
silence" as a means of bolstering the prosecution's case in light of
the defense's "failure to explain or deny" it.31 The Adamson
approach allowed juries to give greater weight to the government's
evidence in the absence of a rebuttal or explanation from the
defendant.
In a real sense, much of what I am saying today about the
search for truth comes down to trusting juries. Trusting them to
weigh the reliability of evidence, trusting them to assess the veracity of confessions, and trusting them to make reasonable inferences
is really what the test ought to be in evaluating the rules.
Almost seventy years ago, in Rosen v. United States the
Supreme Court succinctly stated much of what I have said at
length today: "[T]he truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons . . . hav[ing] knowledge of the
facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury . . ..
If our citizens are to retain their trust in our system of justice,
we must make sure that when we ask them to find the truth, we
allow them, consistently with our Constitution, to see the whole
truth.
In closing, I'll contrast this reasonable basis for trusting in
juries with the reasonable fear that the practices of some lawyers
are twisting the criminal justice system in a perverse manner. The
search for truth should constrain members of our profession at
least as well as it does the system in which they work.
We do have an adversary system. And we proceed from the
belief that in allowing both the prosecution and the defense to
advocate their cases fully, we will uncover the truth. But zealous
advocacy should not mean unbounded advocacy. Counsel's role
must to some extent be defined to reflect the basic purpose of the
adversary system as a means of promoting the discovery of truth.
On the one hand, the prosecutor is not only an advocate. He
has obligations to justice. He must, for instance, disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. My Department's guidelines go further and limit the initiation of prosecution to cases in which the
prosecutor believes that the defendant is in fact guilty and that
prosecution can probably establish that fact to the satisfaction of a
31.
32.

Adamson, 332 U.S. at 56.
Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).

TRUTH IN THE COURTROOM

1987]

fair-minded trier. 33

On the other hand, there are certain constraints on defense
counsel as well. As the Supreme Court said in Nix v. Whiteside:
"[C]ounsel's duty of loyalty and his 'overarching duty to advocate
the defendant's cause'

. . .

is limited to legitimate, lawful conduct

compatible with the very nature of a trial as a search for truth. '34
Such common practices as moving for repeated continuances in the
hope that witnesses will be worn down, forget, or disappear; 5 baiting the judge or prosecutor in the hope of provoking reversible
error;36 and similar tactics are not consistent with this ideal. These
practices directly impede the search for truth without furthering
any legitimate function of adversarial testing. Courts, of course,
have an obligation to act against these abuses, but the women and
men who comprise the bar must remember their obligations as
officers of the court.
Finally, let me say that I do not expect all the problems I've
mentioned to vanish tomorrow. But I do hope that I have
encouraged you to think seriously about the premises of our criminal justice system and how it may be improved.
As aspiring members of the profession, you will someday have
obligations to real clients. But both now and in the future you and
I have a common commitment to preserving and enhancing our
system of justice. In a 1935 decision the Supreme Court concisely
identified the goals of criminal justice: "that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer.

'3 7

By pursuing the search for truth we will be

faithful to these twin ideals and live out the proposition, as
Joubert once put it, that "justice is truth in action."38

33. See U.S. DEP'T
comment (1980).
34.
35.
(1982).
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36. See M. FRANKEL,
37.
38.
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